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Abstract
While budgets for agri-environmental policy in OECD countries are rapidly increasing with current
policy reforms, information about the locally varying demands for policies implemented at various
levels of government remains scarce. In this study, a median voter framework is used to analyse the
demand for landscape management services based on the expenditures of sub-federal governments for
two decentralized landscape management programmes in Switzerland. Furthermore, based on the
expenditures for one cantonal and one national agri-environmental scheme, it is determined whether the
cantonal scheme resulted in a more demand-oriented pattern of expenditures than the national scheme.
The median voter model estimates suggest a high-income elasticity and a low-price elasticity of demand
for landscape management services. Contrary to expectations, both the cantonal and national
expenditures significantly reflected cantonal variations in proxies of the demand for landscape
management services.
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Abstract 
 
While budgets for agri-environmental policy in OECD countries are rapidly increasing with 
current policy reforms, information about the locally varying demands for policies 
implemented at various levels of government remains scarce. In this study, a median voter 
framework is used to analyse the demand for landscape management services based on the 
expenditures of sub-federal governments for two decentralized landscape management 
programmes in Switzerland. Furthermore, based on the expenditures for one cantonal and one 
national agri-environmental scheme, it is determined whether the cantonal scheme resulted in 
a more demand-oriented pattern of expenditures than the national scheme. The median voter 
model estimates suggest a high income elasticity and a low price elasticity of demand for 
landscape management services. Contrary to expectations, both the cantonal and national 
expenditures significantly reflected cantonal variations in proxies of the demand for landscape 
management services.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Current reforms of agricultural policies in OECD countries involve important changes in 
policy objectives from national self-sufficiency goals towards the provision of environmental 
benefits. This shift of emphasis is also increasingly reflected in agricultural budgets for agri-
environment schemes (e.g. OECD, 2004). From an economic perspective, the new policy 
objectives have important implications for agricultural policy design and in particular for the 
scientific information that is required to design efficient agricultural land use policies. 
First, agricultural policy can no longer be based solely on the analysis and 
understanding of agricultural markets. To efficiently allocate public resources to the provision 
of environmental services requires information about the externalities of agricultural land use 
as perceived by the taxpayers. Environmental economists have invested much effort into the 
development of non-market valuation techniques, such as the contingent valuation method, to 
measure these externalities (e.g. Randall, 2002). However, work by psychologists and 
economists shows that these measures remain unreliable (e.g. Schkade and Payne, 1994; List 
and Gallet, 2001; Schläpfer et al., 2004). An alternative to measuring economic benefits and 
damages using stated preference techniques is to estimate demand functions for public goods 
and services using collective choice approaches (e.g., Shapiro and Deacon, 1996). One way to 
do this is by analysing ballot decisions on propositions involving public goods (e.g. Deacon 
and Shapiro, 1975), another is by estimating demand functions that relate local expenditures 
for public goods to characteristics of the local population using a median voter framework 
(e.g. Borcherding and Deacon, 1972). Estimated demand functions include the traditional 
economic variables, (tax) price and income, and provide information about how differences in 
individual income and tax burden affect the preferred quantity of the local public service. 
Knowledge of individual demand functions can be useful for many purposes, including the 
computation of tax structures and expenditure levels which satisfy certain normative criteria 
(Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973). In contrast to thriving applications of stated preference 
surveys to landscape management issues, there have not been any collective choice based 
studies to estimate demand for landscape management services to date. The collective choice 
literature on demands for public goods and services is still largely limited to the traditional 
local public services, such as schools, police, fire protection or city parks. A first aim of the 
present study is to explore the potential of a median voter approach for characterizing the 
demand for agri-environmental services. 
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Second, in contrast to national food security and other traditional public-good benefits, 
many of the environmental benefits of agriculture do not have the character of national public 
goods, but can be considered as services to regional or even local populations. This situation 
poses new challenges to the design of efficient agricultural policy. Uniform national 
application of environmental standards and provision of public goods will in general not be 
efficient (Evans et al., 2003; Flury et al., 2005). On the other hand, local public benefits 
suggest an opportunity to pursue efficient allocation through decentralized decision-making 
and financing by sub-federal governments based on the theory of fiscal federalism (Olsen, 
1965). Theoretically, local agri-environmental decision-making may result in a highly 
desirable adaptation of public spending to locally varying demands (e.g. Stiglitz, 2000). 
Agricultural policies in the past have mostly been implemented at national and supra-national 
levels. Recently, however, Swiss agri-environmental policy has introduced a ‘federalistic’ 
element by enacting the Eco-Quality Directive in 2001. This directive established a 
programme to provide financial support for land managers if the land management outcome 
fulfils specific ecological criteria concerning floristic composition and habitat connectivity 
(Federal Council, 2001). Support through grants from the national government is conditioned 
on the prior passage of a local landscape development concept and 10-30 percent cost sharing 
by the cantonal government. This programme provides a unique opportunity to empirically 
explore the potential of decentralized decision-making for efficient agri-environmental policy. 
Thus, a second aim of the present study is to investigate if the local levels of landscape 
management services due to the new cantonal programme reflect cantonal demands better 
than those of a national programme with similar objectives which had been introduced to 
Swiss agricultural policy in 1991. 
The empirical analyses in this study are based on the 2002 and 2003 data for cantonal 
and federal programmes to provide landscape management services in Switzerland. The paper 
proceeds as follows: In Section 2, a median voter model is applied to estimate the income and 
price elasticities of demand for two programmes implemented by the cantonal governments; 
Section 3 investigates if the cantonal provision of a public service is more responsive to 
cantonal demands than the national provision of a similar public service. Conclusions are 
presented in Section 4. 
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2. Demand estimation in a median voter framework 
 
Conceptual framework 
 
The economic theory of fiscal federalism takes local political jurisdictions as behavioural 
entities whose tax and expenditure decisions may be neither efficient nor fair. Policy 
interventions by central governments, generally via intergovernmental grants, have been 
recommended to correct these failures (Oates, 1972). To optimally design such policies, 
predictive models of local government fiscal choice are needed. 
The most prominent specification of local fiscal choice is the median voter model 
proposed by Bowen (1943), conceptually enriched by Downs (1957) and first used for 
theory-based econometric analysis by Barr and Davis (1966), Borcherding and Deacon 
(1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973). In its empirically most useful form, the median 
voter model hypothesizes a given tax schedule and a single public service for which 
consumer-voters have single-peaked preferences. Voters can be ordered along a continuum 
from low to high demanders of the public service, which results in a distribution of votes by 
these preferred levels of the public service. The rule for local fiscal choice is that a service 
level is chosen that will defeat all others in a majority rule election. Under these assumptions, 
the preferred level of local services will be the median of the quantities demanded by the 
individual voters (see e.g. Borcherding and Deacon, 1972). 
 To use the Bowen-Downs median voter model to empirically identify the crucial 
median service quantity, it is further assumed that the median quantity is the quantity 
demanded by the consumer-voter with the median income. Adding this additional 
assumption produces an analytically powerful proposition: Given these (five) assumptions, 
governments will select their budgetary levels ‘as if’ to maximize the well-being of each 
jurisdiction’s median income family. This proposition stands as political economy’s 
counterpart to the market economy’s supposition that firms are profit maximisers (e.g. see 
Inman 1978). If true, or approximately true, this proposition provides a powerful starting 
point for positive and normative analysis of government behaviour. In effect, the individual 
utility maximising model applied to the median income family can be used to analyse the 
fiscal performance of non-federal governments (Deacon, 1978; Inman, 1978). 
The median voter framework for the economic analysis of government spending has 
not remained unchallenged (Mueller, 2003, p. 243 ff.). To date, few studies have examined if 
median voter predictions outperform predictions based on traditional ‘ad hoc’ models that 
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explain government spending based on mean income and other characteristics of local 
jurisdictions, which ignores public choice considerations. Pommerehne and Frey (1976) 
found that median income worked somewhat better at explaining local public expenditures 
than did mean income. Pommerehne (1978) found that median income performed 
significantly better in municipalities that make decision via direct, town-meeting procedures 
but not in municipalities using representative democratic procedures. Even the existence of 
an optional or obligatory referendum on expenditure bills in cities governed by representative 
assemblies added enough of a constraint on representatives’ behaviour to make the median 
voter model perform perceptibly better than for those cities in which representative 
democracy was able to function unchecked. Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1982, p. 544) 
determined that, within cross-sectional units, higher-income individuals did not appear to 
have any greater taste for public spending. The positive income elasticities in cross sections 
were due entirely to a positive association between community income and expenditures, i.e. 
the relationship that the traditional approach estimated and the public choice approach sought 
to improve upon (Mueller, 2003, p. 245). Rigorous recent econometric tests of the median 
voter income and tax price variables in an expenditure model tended to reject the median 
voter model at the state and county level, but not at the municipal level (Turnbull and Mitias, 
1999). 
The present analysis responds to these challenges in two important ways. First, in 
response to the objections by Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1982), it examines only public 
services related to landscape management. This ‘class’ of public services has been found to 
exhibit a positive income elasticity of demand based on Swiss voting decisions (Schläpfer 
and Hanley, 2003; Schläpfer and Witzig, 2006). The assumption that median quantity is the 
quantity demanded by the consumer-voter with the median income may therefore be 
reasonably well realized with this type of public service. Second, in response to 
Pommerehne’s (1978) evidence that the introduction of representative decision-making may 
weaken the relationship between median voter preferences and final outcomes, the present 
study explicitly examines if there is a difference between estimates from jurisdictions 
employing direct democratic decision elements and those jurisdictions without such decision 
elements. 
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Empirical framework 
 
The sample consists of 25 cantons. Among the 26 Swiss cantons (including the half-cantons) 
the half-canton of Basel City is omitted in the analysis as it does not have an open landscape. 
Multiple regression is used to fit the following function (omitting indices i=1,...25 for the 
cantons): 
 
 Q = c + δ Tm + ε Ym + ω D Tm + θ D Ym,    (1) 
 
where:  
Q = the quantity of the public service in canton i, 
Tm = the tax price of the service for the citizen with the median income in canton i, 
Ym = the median income in canton i, 
D = a binary variable for presence/absence of direct democratic procedures in canton i, 
δ = the tax price coefficient, 
ε = the income coefficient,  
ω = the difference in δ due to direct-democratic procedures, and  
θ = the difference in ε due to direct-democratic procedures. 
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 The quantity of the public service, Q, is measured in Swiss Francs (CHF) expended 
per hectare of agricultural land. Thus, Q is defined as X/a, where X is the total expenditures 
for a specific service, and a is the amount of agricultural land in hectares. Separate regressions 
were run for the following two definitions of X: (1) XEQ is expenditures based on the ‘eco-
quality’ directive of the agricultural law, and (2) XNHP is expenditures based on the ‘nature and 
heritage protection’ law. The tax price of the median voter, Tm, is the median voter’s cost of 
increasing the level of the public service by 1 CHF per hectare. This is given by Tm = τm a(1 - 
r), where τm is the median voter’s tax share, a is the area of the agricultural landscape over 
which the service is provided (as above), and r is the proportion of expenditures for the 
service covered by matching grants from the federal government. The median voter’s tax 
share is his/her contribution to each CHF of public tax revenue (and expenditures). The 
interaction terms with the dummy variable (D) are included in the model to account for 
potential effects of the presence/absence of direct democratic procedures on the parameter 
estimates. 
 
Measurement of variables 
 
Data for expenditures on eco-quality (XEQ) and agriculturally utilised land area (a) for the years 
2002 and 2003 were available from the annual Agricultural Reports (Federal Office of 
Agriculture, 2003 and 2004). The expenditures based on the Law on Nature and Heritage 
Protection (Federal Parliament, 2003) (XNHP) and the data concerning the proportion of funding 
provided through matching grants of the national government (r) for the years 2002 and 2003 
were obtained from the Federal Office of Environment, Forest and Landscape. 
Median income was computed from the distribution of reported incomes available from 
the Federal Tax Administration for the fiscal period 1997/98 (Federal Tax Administration, 
2004). Reported incomes of couples were ‘split’ and pooled with the reported incomes of 
individuals to derive the median income. The median income’s tax share was obtained by 
dividing this (median) income level’s tax burden by the total cantonal income tax revenue from 
natural persons (Federal Tax Administration, 2004). Using this variable implies the assumption 
that the median income taxpayer pays the same fraction of the income taxes as he or she does 
of the total cantonal tax revenue. This is an assumption of convenience which can be justified 
by the fact that the other direct tax (i.e. the wealth tax), contributes only a small fraction to the 
total tax revenues. The regression was also computed with mean (instead of median) income, 
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where mean income is the per capita income for 2001 obtained from the Federal Office of 
Statistics. 
The binary variable for the presence/absence of direct democratic procedures in the 
cantons is based on the composite index for direct democratic rights used by Frey and Stutzer 
(2000), which is based on Trechsel and Serdült (1999). The dummy variable D was coded 1 if 
the index was 4 or higher, and 0 if the index was below 4 (in nine cases). 
 
Description of the landscape management programmes 
 
The eco-quality (EQ) payments based on the recent ‘Eco-Quality Directive’ of the federal 
Law on Agriculture were introduced in 2001 (Federal Parliament, 1998; Federal Council, 
2001). The programme was designed as an outcome-oriented incentive scheme to compensate 
farmers for providing elevated levels of floristic diversity and elevated habitat connectivity 
(Federal Council, 2001). Criteria for participation are determined by the cantonal authorities, 
but must comply with minimal requirements of the national authorities. Payments for habitat 
connectivity require that the farmland being supported is part of a local landscape 
development concept which has to be approved by the cantonal authorities. Farmer enrolment 
in the programme is for a minimum of six years. The financing decision is made by the 
cantonal authorities and supported by the national government through matching grants which 
cover 70-90 percent of the costs, depending on an official index of the canton’s long-term 
financial resources. 
 The nature and heritage protection (NHP) payments based on Article 18d of the 
national ‘Law of Nature and Heritage Protection’ (Federal Parliament, 2003) are contractual 
cost sharing payments to support low-input agricultural land management in nature reserves. 
The national government contributes to these payments through matching grants. The 
percentage support also depends on the cantonal financial resources index and amounted to 
between 20 and 97 percent in the year 2002. Hence, both programmes are based on national 
laws, but the cantons are responsible for the decisions about the quantity of the goods to be 
provided. 
 
Questions 
 
The following questions are examined: (1) are expenditure levels systematically related to the 
variables for median tax price and median income?; (2) is model performance improved by 
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fitting median income, compared with mean income?; (3) are the ‘effects’ of income and tax 
price different in jurisdictions employing direct democratic decision procedures?; and (4) what 
is the magnitude of the price and income elasticities of the examined landscape management 
services based on the median voter model results? 
 
Results and discussion 
 
The models estimated to explain cantonal expenditure levels (per-hectare expenditures in a 
canton) for the eco-quality and the nature protection services are presented in Table 1. 
Results are reported for four model specifications, which address each of the four questions 
stated above. 
 In the simple linear model – including median tax price and median income – the 
income variable is significant in both programmes and both years (Table 1, model 1). The tax 
price variable is not significant, indicating that these per-capita costs per unit of the public 
service did not systematically affect the cantonal quantity decisions. The proportion of 
explained variation is between about 20 and 30 percent in these models. Median income did 
not perform better as an explanatory variable than did mean income (Table 1, model 2). This 
finding suggests that income may have determined expenditures in other ways than those 
suggested by the median voter assumptions. 
 The demand model coefficients for cantons that make intensive use of direct 
democratic procedures were different from those of the other cantons (Table 1, model 3). The 
interaction of the dummy variable for direct democratic procedures with the median income 
variable (Ym x D) is significant in both programmes and both years although Ym itself is not 
significant in these models. The coefficients on the variable Ym x D in these models indicate 
that the income elasticity of expenditures per hectare is greater in cantons which make more 
extensive use of direct democracy. A further pattern is that the tax price tends to have a 
(more) negative effect on expenditures in cantons employing direct democracy, although 
none of the test results are significant at conventional levels. This pattern occurs in both 
expenditure categories and both years. 
 Finally, the income elasticity of landscape management services obtained by 
estimating the median voter model in its logarithmic form (with the dependent and the 
independent variables transformed) are in the range of 4 to 6 (Model 4). This is about twice 
the magnitude estimated by Borcherding and Deacon (1972) for the service ‘parks and 
recreation’. This high income elasticity could be interpreted as evidence that landscape 
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amenities management is an extreme luxury good. The price elasticity estimate was not 
significantly different from zero in any of the models. 
Although the number of observations in the cross section is small and the empirical 
evidence for the validity of median voter theory is limited, the analyses shed some light on the 
relationships between income, price and levels of public expenditure for landscape 
management in a federal system. However, great caution should be exercised in drawing any 
conclusions that would rely on a collective choice mechanism as hypothesized in the median 
voter framework. 
 
 
3. Private demand and public provision through cantonal and national government 
 
Conceptual framework 
 
The local provision of public services has the potential to promote an adaptation of the supply 
of local services to local demands (e.g. Olsen, 1965). If the “political market” model of public 
choice theorists applies, then one would expect that the level of public service is higher in 
jurisdictions with a great aggregate demand for the public service and lower in jurisdictions 
with a smaller aggregate demand. 
Agri-environmental support for landscape management services in Switzerland is 
provided through programmes financed by the national government as well as through the 
new eco-quality programme, described in Section 2, which is financed by cantonal 
governments (with matching grants from the national government). Therefore, an interesting 
empirical question is whether the provision of the public service better reflects local demands 
when the service is provided through the cantonal government compared to the national 
government. 
To examine the hypothesis of a more demand-oriented cantonal provision of public 
landscape management services, this section examines the relationship between levels of the 
public service (expenditures per hectare of agricultural land) and important likely 
determinants of the aggregate demand for the public services. These determinants are 
primarily population density because the per capita costs of maintaining a certain land 
management standard decrease with population density, and per capita income. Furthermore, 
the demand may be indicated by the voter support in past popular referenda concerned with 
the introduction of agri-environmental policy. 
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 Empirical framework 
 
The following function is estimated using linear regression: 
 
Q = β0 + β1 P + β2 Y + β3 E       (2) 
 
where  
 Q = quantity of the public service in a canton,  
P = population density in a canton, 
Y = per capita income in a canton (in thousand CHF), 
E = measure of voter demand for national agri-environmental policy in a canton, and  
β  = coefficients of variables. 
 
 As in section 2, Q is measured in CHF expended by a canton for a particular public service 
per unit of agricultural land (i.e. Q = X/a). Separate regressions were run for the following 
definitions of X: (1) XGD equals ‘General direct payments’ (GD) based on the Direct Payment 
Directive of the agricultural law (national programme); (2) XED equals ‘Ecological direct 
payments’ (ED) based on the Direct Payment Directive of the agricultural law (national 
programme); and (3) XEQ equals expenditures based on the Eco-Quality Directive (EQ; see 
above) (cantonal programme). E (ECOVOTE) is defined as the difference between aggregate 
(cantonal-level) approval rates (percent yes) in two important consecutive referenda on 
propositions to reform Swiss agricultural policy. The first (1995) proposition was 
controversial and rejected in the vote mainly because direct payments to farmers were not 
clearly conditioned on ecological services. The second (1996) proposition explicitly 
conditioned direct payments on a set of ecological requirements and was approved by a large 
majority (78 percent) of the votes (Günter et al., 2002). The difference between approval rates 
can therefore be interpreted as an index for the demand for national agri-environmental 
policy. 
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Description of the landscape management programmes 
 
The “general direct payments” (GD) include all cross-compliance payments according to the 
‘Direct Payment Directive’ (Federal Council, 1998). These payments are based on amount of 
agricultural land and heads of farm animals managed according to the provisions of the “proof 
of ecological services”, which concerns nutrient balance, minimal percentage of land in 
ecological set-aside areas, and restrictions on pesticide use. These general (as opposed to the 
more targeted ecological) direct payments constitute the largest bulk of direct payments to 
Swiss farmers (see descriptive statistics in Table 2).  
The ecological direct payments (ED) are also based on the Direct Payment Directive 
(Federal Council, 1998) and comprise land management payments for ecological 
compensation areas, such as nutrient-poor grassland, hedgerows, and orchards (Federal 
Council, 1998).  
The eco-quality payments (EQ) are those based on the Eco-Quality Directive 
described in Section 2. 
 
Data 
 
Data for agricultural direct payments made in each canton (in 2003) were available from the 
agricultural report (Federal Office of Agriculture, 2004). Population density was defined by 
dividing the residential population in 2003 (Federal Office of Statistics, 2005) by the 2003 
agricultural land area in hectares (Federal Office of Agriculture, 2004). Per capita income was 
the same as in Section 2. The data used to derive ECOVOTE were those published by the 
federal administration. The means and standard deviations of the variables are listed in Table 
2. 
 
Question 
 
The specific question examined is whether or not the expenditures of the cantonal programme 
(EQ) are more strongly related to the set of independent variables than the expenditures of the 
two national programmes. The expectation is that independent variables are positive and 
significant in the cantonal programme but insignificant in the national programmes. For each 
programme, the null hypothesis of no association between expenditures and the independent 
variables was tested. 
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 Results and discussion 
 
For a view of the data, Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the cantonal levels of 
public services and voter support for national agri-environmental policy as measured by 
ECOVOTE. While the general direct payments do not show any relationship with voter 
demand for agri-environmental policy (Fig. 1a; correlation coefficient r=0.002, p=0.817), the 
ecological direct payments (r=0.409, p=0.042) and the eco-quality payments (r=0.331, 
p=0.106) are slightly positively associated with voter support for agri-environmental policy 
(Fig. 1b, c.).  
 The results of ordinary least squares regressions are presented in Table 3. The national 
‘general direct payments’ (GD) were not significantly related to any of the variables. This was 
expected because the results refer to a programme that is financed by the national 
government, but does not provide higher budgets where landscape management services are 
in high demand. Population density and income even tended to be negatively related to the 
payments of the programme per hectare, although the coefficients were not significant at 
conventional levels. Based on the R2 values, the proportion of explained variance in the 
dependent variable is very modest. 
 The local level of national ecological direct payments (ED) was significantly 
positively associated with both population density and income. The hypotheses that these 
variables do not affect ED were rejected. The cantonal levels of this public service thus 
appeared to be related to the cantonal demands, although the cantonal governments did not 
have a direct influence on the level of this service. Voter support for national agri-
environmental policy, which was correlated with both income (r=0.39) and population density 
(r=0.29), did not provide any further explanation of ED.  
The level of the eco-quality programme (EQ) was positively associated with cantonal 
income, but negatively related to population density (Table 3). While the first result appears 
to support the hypothesis of a cantonal “political market,” which may govern the expenditures 
for this programme, the latter result strongly contradicts this hypothesis. In this model, the 
ECOVOTE coefficient was not significantly different from zero (t-statistic of 1.2). However, 
it is important to consider that the eco-quality programme was only recently introduced and 
still represents only a very small fraction of the total public expenditures for agriculture (see 
scale of y-axis in Fig. 1). Therefore, the local expenditure decisions for this programme may 
not yet receive sufficient political attention for a well functioning political market to evolve. 
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Overall, the comparison of model results for ED and EQ services provides no evidence 
for a more ‘demand-oriented’ provision of land management services when the programme is 
implemented by the cantons rather than by the national government. On the contrary, the 
national ecological direct payment programme appears to reflect aggregate cantonal demands 
better, although there is no obvious mechanism to explain this result. One possible 
explanation of this result is that social norms induced farmers in high-income, densely 
populated cantons to provide more of the services that are supported through the national 
ecological direct payments, such as hedgerows, orchards or low-input species-rich grassland. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Central governments usually lack sufficient information about the demands for public 
services with public good characteristics. Where public good benefits accrue primarily to 
local or regional populations and taxpayers, decentralized decision-making can improve 
efficient allocation of budgets because local decisions are more likely to reflect local taxpayer 
demands. Agricultural policy in Switzerland has begun to make use of this potential 
advantage by offering matching grants for a new type of landscape management service 
provided by cantonal governments. The cantonal expenditures for this programme, along with 
those for land management services based on a nature protection law, provided an opportunity 
to estimate parameters of the demand for landscape management services using a collective 
choice framework. 
While the income elasticity of the demand for landscape management services was 
very high in the median voter model, the price elasticity was not significantly different from 
zero. The absence of a negative price elasticity casts some doubt on the appropriateness of 
using the median voter model to explain the cantonal expenditures for landscape management 
services in Switzerland. Interestingly, Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and 
Goodman (1973) likewise report insignificant price elasticities for the service ‘parks and 
recreation’ which, among the services previously analysed, most closely resembles those 
examined in the present study. There was no evidence to support the hypothesis that cantonal 
provision of landscape management services in Switzerland would be more responsive to 
cantonal demands than national provision. Surprisingly, the national provision of landscape 
management services was more strongly related to the proxies for cantonal demands than 
cantonal provision. The mechanisms underlying this result are currently unclear and represent 
an important issue for future research. One hypothesis could be that regional differences in 
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farmers’ acceptance of landscape management incentive schemes may drive the observed 
patterns. 
The present analyses rely on a small dataset. Further empirical analysis of regional 
agri-environmental policy programmes is needed before more definitive conclusions can be 
drawn about the efficiency of decentralized decision-making for agri-environmental policies 
in Switzerland, Europe, and other OECD countries. Due to the national or even supra-national 
scale of most agricultural policies, the database for such analysis is currently weak. More 
experimentation with decentralised agri-environmental policies would be highly desirable for 
future research on taxpayer demands for agri-environmental policies. 
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Table 1. Models to explain cantonal expenditures for the Eco-Quality’ (EQ) and the ‘Nature 
and Heritage’ (NHP) programmes 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 (log-log)Service 
and year Variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
t-ratio 
 
Coefficient
 
t-ratio 
 
Coefficient
 
t-ratio 
 
Coefficient 
 
t-ratio 
 
EQ 2002          
 Constant -86.301** -2.149 -34.911 -1.648 -46.821 -1.193 -14.603 -1.253
 Tm -12.532 -0.169 -12.982 -0.174 72.059 0.886 0.249 0.795
 Ym 2.312** 2.658   1.092 1.197 4.729 1.503
 Ymean   1.182** 2.645     
 Tm x D     -211.324 -1.471   
 Ym x D     0.574** 2.613   
 R2 0.254  0.252  0.447  0.121  
 R2 adj. 0.186  0.184  0.336  0.017  
          
EQ 2003          
 Constant -80.463* -2.007 -33.623 -1.630 -37.858 -1.016 -11.051 -1.224
 Tm 23.761 0.320 25.972 0.359 84.344 1.092 0.416 1.683
 Ym 2.293** 2.640   0.968 1.118 4.021 1.653
 Ymean   1.262*** 2.901     
 Tm x D     -117.180 -0.859   
 Ym x D     0.588** 2.815   
 R2 0.241  0.277  0.491  0.162  
 R2 adj. 0.172  0.212  0.389  0.086  
          
NHP 2002          
 Constant -85.539 -1.624 -37.745 -1.390 -37.456 -0.716 -21.297* -2.067
 Tm -0.547 -0.017 3.376 0.106 33.643 0.923 0.307 1.417
 Ym 2.532** 2.225   1.044 0.862 6.561** 2.388
 Ymean   1.473** 2.588     
 Tm x D     -82.024 -1.276   
 Ym x D     0.682** 2.418   
 R2 0.193  0.242  0.379  0.221  
 R2 adj. 0.119  0.173  0.254  0.151  
          
NHP 2003          
 Constant -106.509** -2.218 -50.763** -2.106 -60.145 -1.267 -20.492** -2.191
 Tm 5.947 0.199 11.436 0.404 38.912 1.210 0.189 0.978
 Ym 3.011*** 2.902   1.592 1.448 6.295** 2.525
 Ymean   1.772*** 3.513     
 Tm x D     -88.506 -1.483   
 Ym x D     0.652** 2.528   
 R2 0.283  0.364  0.457  0.226  
 R2 adj. 0.217  0.307  0.349  0.156  
Notes: There are 25 observations in the dataset. The unit of the dependent variables is annual 
expenditures (CHF) per hectare of agriculturally used land. 
Significance levels: *** for p<0.01; ** for p<0.05; and * for p<0.1 
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Table 2. Means and standard deviations of variables used in regressions to compare cantonal 
and national direct payment schemes 
Variable name Description Mean Std. dev. 
GD General direct payments per ha 2074 467.4 
ED Ecological compensation payments per ha 122 45.3 
EQ Eco-quality payments per ha 24.1 19.5 
POPDENS Population per hectare of agricultural land 8.36 8.31 
INCOME Per capita income in thousand CHF 44.9 8.3 
ECOVOTE The difference between cantonal voting outcomes 
(% yes) of two national propositions on agricultural 
reform in 1995 and 1996 (see text) 
23.6 13.2 
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Table 3. Regression models to explain per-hectare expenditures for two nationally and one 
cantonally implemented direct payment schemes of Swiss agricultural policy a
 GD (national) ED (national) EQ (cantonal) 
Variable Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio 
Constant 2733.8**** 5.363 -19.688 -0.506 -32.907* -1.796 
POPDENS -17.044 -1.445 1.638* 1.820 -0.809* -1.909 
INCOME -16.137 -1.314 2.616** 2.791 1.245** 2.821 
ECOVOTE 8.799 1.133 0.472 0.797 0.335 1.201 
n 25 25 25 
R2 0.185 0.493 0.396 
R2 adj. 0.068 0.421 0.310 
a Significance levels: **** for p<0.001, *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, * for p<0.1 
21 
Figure legend 
 
Figure 1 Year 2003 national ‘general direct payments’ (GD), national ‘ecological direct 
payments’ (ED, national) and cantonal ‘payments for biological quality and 
habitat connectivity’ (EQ) in relation to voter support for national agri-
environmental services (ECOVOTE index) in the Swiss cantons. 
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